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During the Cold War, the spectre of nuclear war 
hung over North America. The fear of annihila-
tion prompted the Canadian government, in 
cooperation with the United States, to develop 
a civil defence program with the aim of saving 
lives and infrastructure. The civil defence effort 
cost millions of dollars and enlisted hundreds 
of thousands of volunteers, especially at its 
height in the late 1950s and early 1960s during 
superpower confrontations over Berlin and Cuba. 
For Canadians, if the Cold War had turned hot, 
the war on the home front would have become a 
fight for basic survival, as cities would have been 
incinerated or blanketed with radioactive ash. 
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Résumé :
Du début de la Guerre froide jusqu’au milieu des années 
1960, le gouvernement et les agences gouvernementales 
ont acheté et installé des sirènes pour prévenir des raids 
aériens à travers le pays dans le cadre du programme 
devant préparer le Canada à la guerre nucléaire. Les 
sirènes transformèrent les lieux du quotidien en rappels 
souvent malvenus de la menace constante de la guerre 
nucléaire. Le réseau des sirènes fut démantelé à la f in 
de la Guerre froide, mais cependant, ces cinq dernières 
années, la « redécouverte » des sirènes a suscité des débats 
pour savoir s’il fallait les restaurer et leur conférer une 
nouvelle fonction commémorative, ou les éliminer car 
elles représentaient un héritage de l ’absurdité des plans 
de survie nucléaire. Cette étude, qui recourt à des sources 
d ’archives disponibles depuis peu, présente l ’histoire 
matérielle et l ’impact culturel des sirènes anti-raids 
aériens au Canada.
Abstract
From the early Cold War until the mid-1960s, 
government and military agencies moved to purchase 
and install air raid sirens across the country, as part of a 
program to prepare Canada for nuclear war. The sirens 
transformed everyday public sites into often unwelcome 
reminders of the ever-present threat of nuclear war. The 
siren network was dismantled at the end of the Cold 
War, yet, in the past five years, “rediscovery” of sirens has 
generated debate over whether to restore and repurpose 
the alarms for commemorative display or to discard them 
as a legacy of the absurdity of nuclear survival plans. 
This study, using recently released archival sources, 
presents the material history and cultural impact of the 
Canadian air raid siren.
Fortunately, the world survived the Cold War, yet 
few reminders of the program or of the nuclear 
threat to North America remain. 
In dozens of communities across Canada, 
however, in public parks, on municipal buildings, 
or atop telephone poles lie key artifacts of this pe-
riod—the air raid sirens. Mounted by government 
and military officials between 1951 and 1963, the 
air raid sirens were meant to provide warning of 
nuclear attack, hopefully securing enough time 
to evacuate cities or prompt families to head to 
their fallout shelters. The siren installations, along 
with survival exercises broadcast over radio and 
television, brought nuclear war into everyday life. 
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In the process, the sirens provoked fear, criticism, 
and protest. 
As the Cold War entered a long period of dé-
tente, the sirens remained silent, largely forgotten 
by the public, but maintained and kept in quiet 
readiness by the military. With the fall of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, the Canadian government 
decommissioned the sirens. To save costs, many 
of the sirens were disconnected but left in place 
to rust as silent sentinels, to be rediscovered in 
the process of urban renewal and, in some cases, 
repurposed into sites of commemoration. This 
paper explores the origins and impact of the air 
raid siren network in Canada.1
The first air raid sirens in Canada went up 
during the Second World War. The government, 
fearing attacks by long-range German bombers 
or ship-launched aircraft, implemented a limited 
Air Raid Precautions (ARP) program in major 
population centres and on the east and west coasts 
(Durflinger 2006: 13). The sirens appear to have 
been installed mainly in target areas beginning in 
1941, and eventually reached as far inland as the 
locks at Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario. The National 
Research Council and ARP agencies tested a 
variety of sirens, from small roof or pole-mounted 
klaxons to 2-1/2 ton giants (Montreal Gazette, 
1943). At the end of the war, the government 
ordered the sirens removed. The devices were 
likely sold as scrap or as war surplus, over the 
objections of some local officials (LAC R112, vol. 
32464, file 5423-S50, Siren Installations – Sault 
Ste. Marie, December 19, 1950).
The Canadian government reconsidered its 
decision to dismantle the ARP organization in 
the early postwar years, when the West’s wartime 
alliance with the Soviet Union unravelled. By 
1948, the government ’s Defence Research 
Board had concluded that a future war involving 
Canada would be accompanied by Soviet attacks 
on the North American continent. Their report 
persuaded the Cabinet Defence Committee to 
appoint a federal civil defence coordinator, who 
would work with the military and government 
agencies to develop survival strategies (LAC 
RG 24, vol. 5256, file 22-7-1, Civil Defence 
Organization, April 22, 1948).
The first civil defence (CD) coordinator, 
retired Major-General F. F. Worthington, was 
appointed by defence minister Brooke Claxton 
in October 1948. Worthington, a veteran of both 
world wars and an advocate for civil preparedness, 
set about planning for nuclear war, consulting 
with provincial ministers and his counterparts 
in the United States and the United Kingdom 
(Worthington 1961: 226-34). Worthington’s 
organization, Civil Defence Canada, identified 
an urgent need for an early warning system, 
especially after the Soviet Union detonated its 
first atomic bomb in 1949. Cabinet members 
reviewing Worthington’s plans in March 1950 
decided that an early warning system was 
desirable as long as it did not involve more than 
“looking around until such time as war might 
come” (DHH F. F. Worthington Papers, March 
9, 1950). In the cabinet discussion, ministers 
remarked on the general public’s anxiety about 
nuclear war and expressed their concerns about 
civil defence preparations, especially warning 
systems, provoking undue public alarm. 
Public anxiety was sufficiently acute in some 
Canadian cities, however, that local councils had 
Fig. 1
Students in a Kitchener-
Waterloo school practise 
a “duck-and-cover” drill 
in the hallway, 1951. 
Kitchener-Waterloo 
Record Photographic 
Negative Collection, 
University of Waterloo 
Library.
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moved to set up municipal civil defence agen-
cies without federal or provincial guidance. To 
generate public awareness of war preparations, 
or to encourage volunteers to enlist in first aid 
or other programs, local CD coordinators carried 
out simulated air raids using municipal fire sirens, 
factory steam whistles, and, in some rare cases, 
air raid sirens purchased in the United States. 
Federal officials, who were working quietly with 
the air force to develop a standardized early warn-
ing system, regarded these local, often improvised 
developments with some concern. Local officials 
such as those in Vancouver were under pressure 
from the public and newspaper headlines that 
compared the cautious Canadian progress with 
the rapidly expanding air raid siren network in 
Seattle, Washington (LAC RG 29, vol. 709, file 
110-9-16, August 8, 1961). 
The outbreak of the Korean War in June 
1950 prompted a massive acceleration of defence 
spending and rearmament of the Canadian 
military in preparation for a third world war. As 
part of the new funding formula, Civil Defence 
Canada received funds to issue training aids 
and important equipment to the provinces for 
distribution to local CD agencies. In February 
1951, Paul Martin, minister of national health 
and welfare, announced that cities with popula-
tions of over thirty thousand would soon receive 
air raid sirens for installation in a national early 
warning network, courtesy of the federal govern-
ment (Burtch 2012: 41).
It was not until late 1951 that the federal 
government chose the air raid siren models that 
it would provide to Canadian cities. In the early 
postwar years, a number of firms in Canada, 
the United States, and the United Kingdom 
produced fire warning and air raid sirens 
(LAC R112, vol. 32464, file 5423-S45, Siren 
Installations – Saskatoon, August 7, 1952). 
Civil Defence Canada officials responsible for 
selecting the siren had a large selection from 
which to choose, including gasoline-powered or 
electrically driven models, sirens that could be 
linked in to telephone networks versus those that 
could be controlled manually, new models used by 
American cities across the border, and those that 
had been proven in the United Kingdom during 
the Second World War. Shortly after taking on 
the civil defence portfolio, Paul Martin decided 
his staff ’s deliberations were taking too long. He 
directed CD officials to quickly procure sirens for 
immediate installation (LAC RG 24, vol. 35564, 
file S-1200-C9, Civil Defence Committees, 
February 1951).
By September 1951, federal staff had made 
their selection. The Treasury Board approved the 
purchase of two hundred sirens manufactured by 
Canadian Line Materials (CLM), a Scarborough, 
Ontario firm specializing in electrical transmis-
sion equipment. During the Second World 
War, many of the sirens installed in Canadian 
cities were produced by CLM, which may have 
influenced the government’s decision to issue 
the contract (LAC R112, vol. 32464, file 5423-
S375, Siren Installations – Sudbury, January 26, 
1952). Civil Defence Canada also purchased 
a stock of Federal Electric sirens based on an 
American design, but distributed through the 
Northern Electric Company in Montreal. The 
barbell-shaped CLM siren was a five-horsepower 
model. The Federal model, which resembled a 
pine cone, was rated at two-horsepower. Both 
models of siren were capable of blaring out two 
distinct 100-decibel tones, the “Alert” and “Take 
Cover” signals.
Fig. 2
A two-horsepower 
Federal siren, installed 
on a hydroelectric pole 
in Welland County, 
Ontario. Courtesy of 
Mark Reesor.
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Cities began to receive their sirens in early 
1952, after the manufacturers delivered orders 
to the federal stockpile in Anrprior, Ontario. 
Cities of greatest strategic importance, such as 
Montreal, Toronto, and Ottawa, received large 
shipments of sirens first, while smaller centres 
received their sirens in smaller shipments when 
available. Rapid installation was necessary to 
complete Canada’s nascent early warning system.
Under the terms of the Canadian govern-
ment’s war preparations, the Royal Canadian 
Air Force (RCAF) was primarily responsible 
for detecting and preventing an aerial attack and 
providing early warning to the government of 
Canada. CD officials were originally responsible 
for disseminating warnings to the public. Air 
raid sirens formed the final link in the warning 
chain that began with the country’s radar system 
and small network of ground observers in the far 
north.2 This system eventually expanded into a 
jointly controlled Canadian-U.S. series of radar 
pickets monitored by both militaries under the 
North American Air Defence treaty signed 
in 1958.
As of early 1951, the RCAF agreed to make 
space available to CD liaison officers in its Air 
Defence Command (ADC) headquarters in St. 
Hubert, Quebec. In the event of an attack, the 
ADC controller would inform the liaison officers, 
who would in turn disseminate the warning by 
special telephone link or by teletype to provincial 
control centres. The provincial CD agencies 
would then pass the warning down to target areas 
in the cities under threat. Local authorities would 
then activate the city’s siren network through a 
central control switch, usually located in a fire 
hall or police precinct (LAC RG 24, vol. 17967, 
file 921-100 pt 1, Civil Defence Services – Policy, 
November 30, 1950). The public would be trained 
to turn on their radios once the sirens blared 
their warning in order to receive specific survival 
instructions. 
Rapid installation and central control over 
the air raid siren networks across the country 
was therefore essential if the public was to 
receive sufficient warning to take action that 
would save lives. Yet, in many major population 
centres, a controversial debate over responsibility 
for installing and maintaining the air raid sirens 
caused most Canadian air raid sirens to gather 
dust in storage for years, crippling the public’s 
only warning system.
The federal government’s insistence on 
decentralized control and responsibility for civil 
defence was at the core of the dispute. The model, 
proposed by F. F. Worthington and adopted by 
the federal government, called for a “self-help” 
strategy. This strategy demanded local prepared-
ness within and around target areas, using existing 
municipal police, fire fighters, and paramedics 
supplemented by large numbers of civic-minded 
volunteers who would work to provide shelter 
to the homeless, rescue those trapped in build-
ings, and prevent the spread of fires. Such an 
organization, Worthington reasonably pointed 
out, would save far more lives more quickly than 
waiting on the armed forces would. Under the 
federal model, Worthington’s office provided 
guidance and some limited financial support, 
but the majority of preparations on the ground 
depended on provincial and local resources and 
initiative (Burtch 2012: 37-38). 
Most provinces and municipalities lacked the 
expansive tax base and resources of the federal 
government. At dominion-provincial CD confer-
ences, they argued that the “self-help” strategy 
placed an unfair burden on local governments, 
which could not afford to prepare for natural 
disasters, let alone nuclear war. Led by Ontario 
and Quebec, the provinces rejected the federal 
government’s model with the argument that civil 
defence was an extension of national defence, and 
therefore a federal responsibility. The Ontario 
and Quebec governments refused to provide 
funding to local preparations as a result, and 
refused to sign on to matching funds agreements 
with Ottawa. As a consequence, many local CD 
agencies were starved of resources (Burtch 2012: 
53-55).
Installation of the air raid siren network 
became the most bitterly contested aspect of this 
dispute between the provinces and the federal 
government. Civil Defence Canada’s publicity 
arm had hoped that shipping the sirens to 
target areas would be picked up as positive news 
that depicted rapid progress, with photographs 
of siren installations promoting a message of 
intergovernmental cooperation in civil defence 
(LAC RG 29, vol. 700, file 110-5-1 pt 2, Civil 
Defence Publicity, September 1951). Instead, the 
federal government’s largest shipment of sirens, 
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to Toronto, offered the city and the province a 
platform on which to attack federal policy. In 
1952, Toronto received a shipment of approxi-
mately fifty CLM sirens. The city’s underfunded 
Civil Defence Committee examined the sirens, 
and proclaimed they would not pay for their 
installation (Scrivener, Toronto Star, 2007). The 
Toronto committee believed that city required at 
least eighty-one sirens to provide sufficient warn-
ing in a busy city and dismissed the thirty-five 
CLM sirens provided as underpowered (DHH 
F.F. Worthington Papers, 3 March 1952). The 
city officials’ skepticism was not without merit; 
the Toronto Telegram reported that New York 
City’s first siren test took place in 1951, requiring 
more than 526 sirens (Toronto Telegram, 1951).
Toronto resisted federal pressure to install 
the sirens for more than four years, as the 
CLMs sat in unopened crates in a Toronto 
armoury. The press was impatient for progress 
on the installation of the sirens, especially after 
a 1954 national CD exercise where Toronto 
suffered heavy “casualties” as a consequence of its 
unpreparedness. In a biting editorial, the Toronto 
Telegram apportioned blame equally between 
Ottawa, the province and Toronto:
[The exercise] was a gigantic, a frightening 
farce. Civilian reaction was precisely nil.... They 
were told nothing and they did nothing.... Not 
a single siren uttered a warning. Not because 
there aren’t any sirens. Thirty-one of them are 
here, in crates. Twenty others were recalled by 
Ottawa because they were still in crates. Civil 
Defence in Toronto was shown up yesterday 
for what it is worth—impotent, useless, hope-
less. There was not a single sign of it. Civil 
Defense was yesterday’s worst casualty. It was 
obliterated. As a consequence the casualty 
list was increased by 33,000 persons killed 
unnecessarily.... It could have been otherwise. It 
can only be hoped that the lesson of yesterday 
has struck home, that it will shake Ottawa and 
Queen’s Park and Toronto out of their deadly 
complacency. (Toronto Telegram, 1954)
It took the disaster of Hurricane Hazel later that 
year, which killed eighty and rendered more than 
four thousand families homeless, to reinvigorate 
emergency planning in Toronto. The disaster 
eventually led to a 1955 federal-provincial agree-
ment for CD funding. The city and the federal 
government also compromised. In consultation 
with Toronto officials, Civil Defence Canada 
sought out a larger, louder siren for use in major 
cities, and agreed to pay the full cost of their siting 
and installation.
The situation in Toronto, and similar 
standoffs in major cities such as Ottawa and 
Montreal, where officials refused to fund air raid 
siren installations, did obscure limited progress 
elsewhere (Ottawa Journal, 1952). Sirens were 
slowly but successfully installed in smaller cities 
across the country, largely the result of local 
initiative. In Sudbury, Ontario, which eventually 
received three 105-decibel sirens, city coordinator 
W. J. G. Carr had extremely limited resources: 
“With twenty two [sic] towns and villages organ-
ized and over six hundred volunteers actually 
enrolled and allocated to key positions within 
the civil Defence Plan, I am still operating from 
an office 8’ x 11’ and have a girl help me 15 
hours a week” (LAC R112,vol. 32464, file 5423-
S375, Siren Installations – Sudbury, 26 January 
1952). Despite his obvious limitations, Carr did 
manage to obtain the voluntary cooperation of 
local industries such as the International Nickel 
Company, a partnership that saved costs. The 
company’s electrical engineers managed instal-
lation of the sirens and linked each to a central 
control, and the city’s first local tests were held 
in 1953 (LAC R112,vol. 32464, file 5423-S375, 
Siren Installations – Sudbury, 4 February 1954).
Apart from headlines and editorials, the 
public’s first exposure to Canada’s small air raid 
siren network in the 1950s was the siren test. 
CD officials carried out these tests following 
installation and periodically thereafter. Their 
goals were to test the sound coverage provided by 
sirens mounted across the city or target area and 
to educate the public about how to recognize the 
different warning signals and what actions they 
should take. These tests often involved hundreds 
of observers who reported on the audibility 
of sirens, as well as concerted public relations 
campaigns to forewarn the public. 
Another role of the siren test was to give civil 
defence an exciting presence in everyday life. CD 
organizers hoped to use exercises to persuade the 
public of their responsibility to support their local 
preparedness measures. Exercises using sirens, 
often in tandem with mock air raids carried out 
by RCAF aircraft, were usually the most heavily 
publicized. To further build on public interest, 
the soundings often coincided with civic events 
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or national holidays, such as the launch of a CD 
exhibit or the short-lived 1957-1958 National 
Civil Defence Day (Burtch 2012: 70).  
Civil defence planners used siren system 
tests to provide tangible evidence of progress in 
emergency planning. Public reaction to the tests, 
however, raised important questions about the 
efficacy of the sirens and, by extension, of civil 
defence as a whole. The Toronto CD committee’s 
disdain for the CLM and Federal sirens was 
prescient. In test after test, CD officials realized 
they had too few sirens to provide adequate 
warning to the public. Subtle changes in wind 
direction or temperature adversely affected where 
the sirens could be heard. Buildings and natural 
obstructions interfered with sound transmission. 
Electrical malfunctions sometimes meant that 
the sirens went dead after a few seconds of 
wailing, had to be started manually, or, in several 
cases, accidentally sparked fires. 
The press, which was often present for 
siren exercises, noted these shortcomings and 
ran stories that featured the failings of the siren 
network, prompting defensive editorials from 
CD coordinators (LAC R112, vol. 32464, file 
5423-S375, Siren Installations – Sudbury, 10 
February 1953). In correspondence with the 
federal CD office, however, local coordinators 
offered blunt assessments. After blasting the air 
raid siren to welcome a convoy of federal CD 
vehicles to Saskatoon, D. J. Fusedale lamented 
the ineffectiveness of his city’s only warning siren: 
I had it mounted on the extreme peak of the 
Police Station where it was entirely unob-
structed and five blocks away it could not be 
heard over normal traffic noise.... I had given 
so much publicity to the fact that it was going 
off, and warned people not to be frightened 
that I’m sure thousands were disappointed 
and finished by laughing at it. (LAC RG 29, 
vol 57, file 100-5-13, Civil Defence Convoy, 
16 November 1953)
 A scientific test of a two-horsepower Federal 
siren by the University of Saskatoon’s Physics 
Department reinforced the shortcomings of the 
low-powered models made available to cities. 
Despite running the siren for hours atop a 30-
foot tower, the signal went entirely unnoticed by 
students and faculty, leading the department to 
conclude that “scores of them would be required 
for adequate coverage, and even then it might 
be necessary to use some system of whistles or 
bells installed inside large buildings” (LAC R112, 
vol. 32464, file 5423-S45, Siren Installations – 
Saskatoon, 9 December 1955). 
Even more embarrassing to CD organizers 
was the failure of sirens during large-scale public 
exercises, such as Operation Lifesaver in Calgary 
in 1955. During this exercise, which simulated 
a crash evacuation of the northeast quadrant of 
the city, more than forty thousand were expected 
to leave the city. The actual number who did 
leave was closer to five thousand. To explain this 
shortfall, some reporters blamed the sirens, whose 
signals were either not heard or not understood 
by the public (Toronto Star, 1955). Privately, CD 
officials bitterly blamed public apathy for not 
paying attention to their instruction or ignor-
ing air raid siren tests altogether. On the first 
National Civil Defence Day in October 1957, 
St. John’s CD director Peter Cashin switched on 
Fig. 3
An advertisement for 
the ten-horsepower 
siren glossed over 
the many technical 
glitches. The Canadian 
government eventually 
sued its supplier of 
Mobil-Directos for 
damages. Library and 
Archives Canada, 
R112 Vol 31427 File 
6001-Sirens/1 pt. 8.
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the sirens as part of an exercise to clear the streets 
for five minutes. The public carried on with their 
daily business, ignoring the CD instruction to 
take cover (LAC RG 29, vol. 646, file 100-5-25, 
8 October 1957). Results such as the Lifesaver 
exercise and the St. John’s debacle suggest that 
most Canadians did not permit atomic anxiety to 
intrude on their everyday lives if they were aware 
that an exercise was underway.
By 1959, the public’s utter lack of confidence 
in CD’s half-measures and general lack of 
progress prompted a major re-organization 
of emergency planning responsibilities in the 
federal government. Civil Defence Canada 
was dissolved, replaced with the Emergency 
Measures Organization, and the Canadian Army 
was directed to take responsibility for “national 
survival.” Among the military’s newfound tasks 
was to complete the siren work that Civil Defence 
Canada had started (LAC RG 2, vol. 2233, file 
790 H B, 28 May 1959). 
Years of budgetary neglect and drift had left 
the siren network badly behind the times. The 
network was originally meant to warn a small 
number of cities of a direct attack with a nuclear 
weapon delivered by Soviet bombers. By 1954 the 
government had concluded that the radioactive 
fallout created by a likely nuclear attack on North 
America would blanket much of the populated 
areas of Canada, not just major industrial centres 
or military targets. A major component of the 
Canadian army’s new tasks was to update the 
siren network with newer, more powerful sirens 
and to extend the warning network into many 
more communities to provide adequate warning 
of the arrival of fallout. When the army assumed 
control of public warning from Civil Defence 
Canada, only 350 sirens had been installed across 
the country (LAC R112, vol. 31873, file 1284-1, 
pt.1, Communications – Warning System – 
Policy, September 15, 1959). From 1960 to 1965, 
the Canadian Army embarked on a major capital 
procurement and construction plan, ultimately 
installing 1,700 sirens across the country, all of 
which were linked into emergency government 
bunkers and secure communications hubs. The 
military named its network the National Survival 
Attack Warning System, or NSAWS.
Within months of assuming responsibility, 
the army created an expanded and prioritized list 
of air raid siren installations, with installations 
moving away from city cores and into neighbour-
ing communities and suburbs. As the municipal-
ities were no longer responsible for installing or 
maintaining sirens, the military’s construction 
plan was far more expedient. In November 1959, 
the Army Works Services, an engineering branch 
of the Canadian Army, was assigned a massive 
task. The AWS procured sirens, determined the 
location of the 1,700 sirens to be installed, and 
negotiated with school boards, churches, hydro-
electric companies, and municipal councils for 
property leases and electrical supply. They also 
subcontracted with hundreds of local contractors 
to install the sirens (LAC R112, vol. 31427, file 
6001 Sirens/1 Equipment and Stores – Local 
Public Warning Sirens, January 27, 1960).
New, heavy-duty sirens were added to the 
Canadian inventory. The army installed its first 
sirens in Toronto. It had inherited two hundred 
ten-horsepower sirens from Civil Defence 
Canada that had been ordered in 1956: the 
Mobil-Directo sirens, manufactured by the 
American firm Blersach and Niedermeyer and 
imported by the General Supply Company of 
Canada, an Ottawa firm. The Mobil-Directos 
were chosen to replace or supplement the much-
criticized CLM and Federal sirens. Unlike their 
predecessors, which could be easily missed on 
telephone poles or rooftops, the Mobil-Directos 
featured a large, curved horn that arced above 
its electric motor. The horn concentrated the 
wail of the engine into a beam of sound while 
the entire siren rotated on its base, providing 
“omni-directional” audio coverage. 
The extent and urgency of the army’s siren 
installation program accelerated dramatically in 
1960 and 1961, as a prolonged standoff between 
the West and the Soviet Union over access to 
Berlin led to increased war readiness through-
out the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(Maloney 1997:159-62). The army’s national 
survival program received a substantial boost in 
funding in the summer of 1961, including more 
than two million dollars ($15 million in 2012 
figures) for new siren procurement to cover thirty 
additional areas. More than six hundred addi-
tional sirens were purchased, many of which were 
provided by CLM in Scarborough. The CLM 
factory produced variants of its five-horsepower 
engine, as well as a much larger ten-horsepower 
rotating siren. The ten-horsepower CLM would 
Material Culture Review 74-75 (Spring 2012) / Revue de la culture matérielle 74-75 (printemps 2012)   109
become the most visible and widely used heavy 
siren in Canada. Resembling a bell turned on 
its side, its powerful horn rotated much like the 
Mobil-Directo. This siren was most frequently 
depicted in emergency measures publicity and 
instruction manuals, but is perhaps most famous 
for its use in the 1980 film Blues Brothers, where 
the protagonists strapped a CLM siren to their 
car for use as an improvised megaphone.  
As military engineers went about charting 
the placement of the expanded siren network, 
they operated under guidelines to avoid, where 
possible, siting sirens on privately owned land. 
This stipulation was included for expedience, 
because it was much cheaper and easier to place 
the sirens on lands owned by government or 
public utilities but also less likely to be subject 
to debate or costly renegotiation when private 
property changed hands (LAC R112, vol. 31427, 
file 6001 Sirens/1 Equipment and Stores – Local 
Public Warning Sirens, January 27, 1960). The 
army’s installation guidelines did not entirely 
avoid controversy, however, as some communities 
objected vocally to the sirens’ becoming part of 
their suburban landscape.  
Most of the initial protests directed at sirens 
were driven by local community associations in 
suburbs and were based on fears that a local siren 
installation would reduce the value of homes in 
residential neighbourhoods. Freestanding siren 
towers would have been immediately noticeable 
in a suburban environment, as each steel or wood 
tower was approximately forty-five feet in height 
and crowned with the siren on a metal mainten-
ance platform. In Ottawa, the military’s request 
to install a siren on city property in the midst of 
the Mooney’s Bay suburb led to consultations 
between the area’s city councillor and local 
homeowners. The community agreed to host the 
siren, so long as it was moved out of sight of the 
homes then constructed. In this case, the military 
responded that such a move would render the 
siren useless as a warning device and the region 
would require two or three additional sirens to 
make up for the change (COA RG20-6-39, 
1960). Sirens installed near elementary schools 
appear to have been particularly controversial, 
again for their adverse affect on property values, 
but also out of concern for the children. In 
October 1961, a military engineer reported that 
Sarnia’s residents were “violently opposed” to an 
installation near a suburban elementary school. 
Eventually the residents petitioned the minister 
of defence, Douglas Harkness, and sought a 
court injunction to prevent installation. Previous 
petitions in Sarnia had led the military to move 
sirens out of sight, but, on this occasion, the 
community effort was unsuccessful, and the 
siren was installed as planned (LAC R112, vol. 
32464, file 5423-S40, Siren Installations – Sarnia, 
January 23, 1961).
 The military’s installation program was 
largely successful. By late 1961, hundreds of 
new sirens had been installed across the country. 
Military engineers were pressured to work 
quickly so that many sirens would be in place 
in time for the country’s first “national survival” 
exercise, Operation Tocsin B on November 13, 
1961. The exercise, which featured a three-hour 
live broadcast on radio and television, simulated 
a Soviet attack on Canada using bomber aircraft 
Fig. 4
Canadian artist Adrian 
Göllner blended nostalgia 
and Cold War anxiety 
for his 2000 “Fission” 
series of public art posters 
mounted at Ottawa 
bus stops. Be Prepared, 
Adrian Göllner, 2000.
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and missiles. Three million people, including 
Prime Minister John Diefenbaker and his wife, 
were “killed” in the attack, and millions more were 
injured or rendered homeless (Burtch 2012: 182-
83). To contribute to the realism of the scenario 
and to test their effectiveness, Canada’s air raid 
sirens went into operation.  
The public reaction to the Tocsin B exercise 
was swift and furious. To many Canadians, the 
exercise was their first exposure to Canada’s CD 
plans, and they were angered at the government’s 
questionable decision to classify an exercise in 
which three million were reported killed “a suc-
cess.”  The exercise took place amid the major war 
scare over Berlin, an enormous Soviet thermo-
nuclear test, and the rise of a vocal disarmament 
movement in Canada that regarded nuclear war 
preparations as a cruel hoax. Though much anger 
was directed at the government for providing 
blast bunkers for politicians and civil servants, 
the sirens were also subjected to substantial 
criticism. Some observers were disappointed 
when they could not hear the sirens from within 
their homes, such as a Vancouver Sun reporter, 
who wryly remarked, “If a genuine attack should 
come, which is most unlikely, these sirens could 
toot their fool heads off without penetrating the 
consciousness of this household” (Weir, Vancouver 
Sun, 1961). Those who could hear the sirens, such 
as Stephen and Mary Leskard in Vancouver, also 
wrote to the prime minister or other officials to 
express their outrage:
We are one of those families who died this 
morning…. Through you we wish to thank 
the Government and all others concerned 
with National Defense for sparing us the 
unpleasantness of dying unwarned. The sirens 
were quite loud. With our children we looked 
for the shelters, since we are not in the income 
bracket entitling us to one of our own, but there 
were none. (LAC John Diefenbaker Fonds, 
MG 26 M, vol. 48, file 140, Civil Defence, 
May 5, 1961)
To many who responded to the Tocsin B 
exercise, air raid sirens, just as fallout shelters and 
other manifestations of emergency preparedness, 
were symbolic of the futility of the very concept 
of survival in an era of nuclear war (Burtch 2012: 
195-99). As the Leskards pointed out, the sirens 
were useless if the government could not provide 
the public with the means to survive the attack 
sirens warned against. Many editorialists, too, 
pointed out that even if the sirens were completely 
audible, in the age of the intercontinental ballistic 
missile, the public would have only 15 minutes 
after a missile launch to make their preparations. 
The sirens would sound too late to do any good 
(Knowles, Saskatoon Star Phoenix, 1961).3
In fact, the obsolescence of the siren system 
was a good deal worse than the public knew. 
When the military launched its attack warning 
system, of which the sirens were a key part, they 
did so on the specific understanding that the 
entire undertaking was in response to the threat 
from manned bomber aircraft (LAC R112, vol. 
31873, file 1284-1, pt.1, Communications – 
Warning System – Policy, July 31, 1959). The 
military’s intelligence suggested that the ballistic 
missile threat would not be sufficiently advanced 
until the late 1960s, so planners operated on the 
assumption of having three hours from detection 
of an air offensive to warn the public. Even this 
generous window was tight to have any effect, as 
fan-outs from NORAD HQ to local commands 
took ninety minutes or longer (DHH Hitsman 
1962: 43). Prime Minister Diefenbaker’s insist-
ence that he or a deputy had to first approve any 
public alerts created a source of further delay in 
transmitting warnings to the public. The military 
installed red phones in the prime minister’s 
residence, the East Block of Parliament Hill, and 
a number of other senior officials’ residences to 
cover this demand. 
Yet even if the warnings were successfully 
transmitted to the municipal level, where the 
siren circuits were still controlled, technical and 
Fig. 5
The restored 
Victoria Park siren, 
commemorated as a Cold 
War relic. Courtesy of 
Stevie Wilson.
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environmental problems plagued the warning 
devices. The most serious problem facing the si-
ren system was how to ensure 24-hour, all-season 
coverage even in Canada’s taxing winter condi-
tions. On multiple occasions, Edmonton’s entire 
air raid siren network was frozen solid following 
blizzards or freezing rain, as was Ottawa’s. The 
military proposed a number of solutions, from 
specially engineered covers to disposable plastic 
wrap, but the problem was so acute that all testing 
was suspended in winter months (LAC R112 vol 
32465, file 5423-2, Siren Installations – AWS 
Procedures, June 12,1963). The Mobil-Directo 
sirens caused sufficient technical problems 
that the government sued the General Supply 
Company of Ottawa for hundreds of thousands 
of dollars in damages. 
By 1962, air raid sirens had been present in 
many cities across Canada for the better part of 
a decade. They were infrequently the subject of 
criticism, occasional protest, but on the whole 
they were ignored, their grim purpose kept out 
of mind. Their penetration of Canadian domestic 
life can, however, be gauged, particularly upon 
examination of those rare occasions where sirens 
sounded accidentally, without benefit of fore-
warning by civic officials or exercise organizers 
armed with reassuring scripts. In many of the 
accidental soundings that have been documented, 
a clear pattern of behaviour governed by fear and 
panic can be seen. In 1954, a fire in Winnipeg set 
off the city’s air raid sirens late at night. The wail 
prompted thousands of frightened residents to 
rush to the phones, which jammed switchboards 
reserved for emergency workers. CD workers 
had told the public during exercises that if they 
heard the sirens they should switch on their radio, 
an instruction that was forgotten in the flare of 
panic. To avoid similar panics during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis in 1962, several city councils passed 
ordinances to forbid emergency vehicles from 
using their sirens because the councillors feared 
the signals would be mistaken for an attack 
warning (Burtch 2012: 89, 209).  In September 
1964, when a hunter’s shotgun blast damaged a 
transmission line between the Diefenbunker and 
Ottawa, all thirty-nine of the city’s sirens went 
off at once and blared for a half hour. During the 
bedlam, the public ran to their vehicles, clogging 
the highways in an effort to flee the city (CP, 
Windsor Star, 1964). 
In each of these scenarios, the meaning 
that CD and military officials had attached to 
the sirens was lost in the panic. The public did 
not view the sirens’ wail as a prompting to turn 
on their radio for instructions; they reacted 
instinctively. They sought reassurance from their 
local police, or, in the Ottawa example, took to 
the streets to save themselves. In these unexpected 
accidents, the sirens were interpreted as heralds 
of doom. As one of the Emergency Measures 
Organization’s senior directors explained in 
1966, “People are simply not so frightened of the 
H-Bomb now…. You learn to live with danger 
and become a little more tolerant of it” (Regina 
Leader-Post, September 15, 1966). All Canadians 
lived under the shadow of the bomb. In the 
incidents described above, for a few moments, the 
sirens brought that residual fear of annihilation 
into terrifying proximity with the everyday.
As the intense East-West confrontations of 
the early Cold War ebbed, particularly with the 
peaceful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis 
and the signature of the 1964 Partial Test Ban 
Treaty, the pace of military planning for national 
survival slowed. The improved state of interna-
tional relations, paired with a slowing economy 
and government austerity measures, spelled 
the beginning of the end for Canada’s air raid 
sirens. In 1968, the federal cabinet cut funding 
for emergency measures. One of the key savings 
was found by cutting communication links 
with hundreds of sirens across the country and 
relying instead on the emergency radio broadcast 
system to transmit an alert. In their discussion 
of the cuts, the cabinet concluded that severing 
communication links was a temporary measure 
that could be reversed “in a matter of hours or a 
few days” if an attack seemed likely (LAC RG 
2 Series A-5-a, vol. 6338, Cabinet Conclusions, 
January 10, 1968). As a result, inactive sirens 
remained in place in communities, but were no 
longer connected to provincial and municipal 
networks. 
 By the early 1980s, many of the sirens had 
been dormant for more than a decade. Unless 
the sirens were readily visible in the city, most 
Canadians had either forgotten about the extent 
of the network or had grown up without any 
exposure to the devices. Every year, a handful 
of military technicians would venture forth to 
service and test the sirens by spinning up their 
112  Material Culture Review 74-75 (Spring 2012) / Revue de la culture matérielle 74-75 (printemps 2012)
rotors, but they were otherwise silent (Bartley, 
Windsor Star, 1980). The siren network briefly 
entered the news in 1980. Prompted by public 
anxiety about international stability following 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, emergency 
planners publicly speculated about reactivating 
the sirens, but took no action. Canadian officials 
also briefly explored updating the air raid warning 
system as part of discussions with the United 
States about changes to continental air defence 
equipment, but the focus of both countries’ 
militaries was on monitoring stations in the far 
north, not klaxons in the south (Douglas, Ottawa 
Citizen, 1980). 
The end of the Cold War in 1991 brought 
to a close the long nuclear standoff between 
the East and the West. The atmosphere of 
international cooperation that followed did 
not bring about a lasting world peace, as some 
had hoped. While dirty civil wars erupted on 
the periphery of Cold War empires, the risk 
of nuclear war had apparently vanished. With 
it vanished the need to maintain the siren 
network. The sound of the sirens had also lost 
their menace; after an accidental two-hour blast 
of the sirens in Kitchener-Waterloo, Ontario, 
residents complained to the city but did not panic: 
“Why do we need air raid sirens in 1994?” some 
asked incredulously (Kitchener-Waterloo Record, 
September 29, 1994). The federal government 
agreed and, in April 1994, as part of a new round 
of cuts to defence, ordered more than 1,500 sirens 
disconnected or scrapped. Those sirens that could 
be easily removed were sold for scrap, while 
costlier installations were left to rust in place, 
thrown out when buildings were re-roofed or 
taken down as part of urban renewal (Scrivener, 
Toronto Star, 2007).
The government’s decision to decommission 
the air raid siren network in the 1990s caused 
many of the sirens to disappear into scrapyards 
and private collections. Very few have survived. 
Those sirens that have survived have done so 
either because they escaped notice, or were 
purposefully preserved by local, regional, or 
national museum initiatives. In the process of 
their transition, the air raid sirens have acquired 
new uses and cultural meaning, linked to heritage 
activities and nostalgia for a “Cold War culture.” 
The last time the air raid sirens were sounded 
in Ottawa, for example, was as part of the city’s 
celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the end 
of the Second World War in 1995. In these 
celebrations, the sirens were used to signify vic-
tory over adversity rather than the beginning of 
a nuclear war, though a few letter-writers to the 
newspapers said the sirens evoked the dark days 
of the Cold War. After the 50th anniversary of 
V-E day, city of Ottawa staff, with the consent of 
the armed forces, transferred the city’s downtown 
sirens to the Canadian War Museum (CWM 
19950013-001).  
Some sirens that have been “discovered” 
through urban renewal or heritage projects 
have also been conserved and repurposed for 
community heritage. A siren tower on the 
property of Bellwood Centres for Community 
Living in Toronto was preserved in 2007 as part 
of a major renovation. The executive director 
of the Bellwood was pleased to keep the siren 
as a landmark and historic piece because of 
her own personal memory of participating in 
air raid exercises. The project architect, David 
Warne, wanted the siren included in plans for a 
discovery walk as a piece of “urban archaeology,” 
and a “romanticized idea of the industrial era” 
(Scrivener, Toronto Star, 2007). In Toronto’s case, 
Warne’s observation was relevant, as Canadian 
Line Materials in Scarborough produced half of 
the overall siren network before the company was 
absorbed by a larger firm. The Bellwood siren is 
part of the industrial history of Toronto. 
Not all heritage initiatives passed with-
out incident. In 2010, a city crew in North 
Vancouver removed a rusting ten-horsepower 
Mobil-Directo siren from its perch in Victoria 
Park, where the army had first installed it in 
1960. Many residents of an apartment building 
overlooking the park were relieved to see it go. 
Linda Heese’s apartment looked out on the park, 
and she always wanted to see the siren removed. 
The siren sat across the park from one of North 
Vancouver’s war memorials. Heese, and others 
in her building, believed the siren represented a 
time of fear, paranoia, and suspicion, and clashed 
with the cenotaph, which she associated with 
loss and hope for the future. She later read with 
dismay that the city had only taken down the 
siren temporarily with the intent to refurbish it 
and attach a commemorative plaque to the siren 
tower. With more than sixty local residents, she 
organized a petition to request North Vancouver’s 
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city council moving the siren elsewhere (personal 
communication, March 30, 2012). 
The matter came to a vote at city council, 
where Heese encountered opposition from 
another citizen, R. G. Scott who, with representa-
tives of the Canadian Legion, argued to keep the 
siren as planned. For Scott and others, preserving 
and interpreting the siren was important for local 
and national history. As he told a newspaper, “We 
should keep this thing, not all history is pretty 
or beautiful.... I want to tell my son and future 
generations the fear we lived under” (Alldritt, 
North Shore News, 2010). Ultimately the North 
Vancouver city council sided with Scott, and the 
restored siren was later put in place. The plaque, 
paid for by private donation, briefly explains the 
reasons for the siren’s installation and its later 
deactivation, and justifies its continued presence: 
“It now stands, silently alerting us to be mindful 
of the past so that we can work together for a 
peaceful future” (Wilson, Scout Magazine, 2012). 
Over the course of its lifespan, and largely due 
to local initiative, the North Vancouver siren was 
transformed from a symbol of imminent nuclear 
war, to a rusting eyesore to a commemorative 
landmark. Most of Canada’s sirens, however, have 
not been subjected to this transformative process, 
and have either been scrapped or forgotten. With 
their destruction is lost a significant if largely 
unregarded chapter in the history of Canada’s 
Cold War home front. Their importance is 
related to their production and intended use. At 
its height, in the 1960s, the air raid siren network 
brought the threat of nuclear war into hundreds 
of communities. It represented the only readily 
visible, and, during testing, audible link between 
those communities and an early warning system 
that eventually spanned the far reaches of the 
North, and was linked to military commands and 
the centre of power in Ottawa. The sirens are also 
representative of a chapter in Canadian industrial 
history, as the Canadian Line Materials sirens 
produced in Scarborough, Ontario, were the most 
widely installed. The Canadian sirens formed a 
part of the vast amount of materiel procured at 
substantial cost by the military as part of a largely 
invisible effort to fight the Cold War at home. 
The wider cultural impact of the sirens’ 
installation and testing appears to have varied 
depending on local conditions. In many com-
munities, the sirens remained silent for more 
than a generation, and their ominous significance 
may have passed unnoticed by all but a few who 
knew where they were located. Where sirens 
sounded accidentally, especially during times of 
great international tension, the sirens provoked 
moments of instinctual flight response from a 
public that largely ignored the threat of nuclear 
war as an everyday survival mechanism. When 
sirens sounded too frequently, whether by ac-
cident or through scheduled tests, they lost their 
impact in the affected community, becoming in 
the process a source of irritation rather than fear. 
The sirens, and the early warning network 
to which they were linked, were part of a techno-
logical solution to a problem created by another 
piece of technology—the nuclear bomb and its 
projected impact in a future war. The govern-
ment argued that with sufficient warning, some 
Canadians, but not all, would survive the nuclear 
storm. The rapid pace of the arms race, however, 
rapidly rendered the sirens, and their accompany-
ing CD instruction, obsolete. The sirens could not 
be sounded swiftly enough to be of much use in a 
war fought with intercontinental ballistic missiles. 
Well before the era of the ICBM, failed siren tests 
led the press and a vocal minority of Canadians 
to rail at the futility of preparations. To many, 
Fig. 6
The restored 
Victoria Park siren, 
commemorated as a Cold 
War relic. Courtesy of 
Stevie Wilson.
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sirens, and the strategies they supported, such as 
fallout shelters, presented a delusional vision of 
security in a fundamentally insecure world. The 
government itself largely abandoned the sirens 
five years after emplacing them. Given their 
history, it is not surprising that the repurposing 
of sirens as commemorative objects has proven 
occasionally controversial. Yet it is worth noting 
that while the air raid sirens have mostly been 
consigned to scrap or to rust or transferred to the 
domain of historians and museums, the nuclear 
arsenals the sirens were meant to warn against 
remain in silent readiness.
Notes
1. Note on citations: this paper is derived primarily from archival sources housed at Library and Archives Canada. 
In-text citations of archival documents list the record group, accessions, volumes, and the file name, number, and 
original date of authorship. The references list the name and location of the record groups, as well as any information 
not included in the in-text citations.
2. At that point, American-Canadian cooperation on the early warning network had not been implemented. Rather, 
there was a mix of local Canadian radar assets, RCMP outposts, and volunteer ground observers trained to report 
movement of four-engine aircraft in the north (LAC RG 24, vol, 19767, file 921-100, A/M Curtis to G/C, Air 
Defence Group, St. Hubert, September 25, 1950).
3. Most of the Canadian opposition to sirens, and to CD measures as a whole, were expressed in writing to civic 
officials. Street demonstrations did occur, but mainly in support of the broader aim of disarmament. Disarmament 
activists pointed to the easily perceived ineffectiveness of CD as evidence that the program was a hoax, but CD 
measures themselves did not provoke direct action. In the United States, because the siren system was far more 
extensive (New York City’s system of working sirens alone was equal to a third of Canada’s entire inventory), 
exercises more frequent, and the decision in some areas to make participation in civil defence exercises mandatory, 
dissent that would otherwise have remained private turned public. In New York City’s OPAL series of exercises, 
from 1955 to 1961, the number of anti-war protesters increased each year. The police fined and arrested some of 
the protesters, which drew greater media attention. However, it appears that most Americans, such as the baseball 
fans who crowded the stadium on the day of New York’s shelter test, were as prepared as Canadians to ignore the 
wail of the sirens as an inconvenience of Cold War life. The United States was more aware of the public’s seeming 
indifference to preparedness measures—a Federal Civil Defence Administration study concluded early on that 
only 8 per cent of people in a target area would try to escape the bomb, even with sufficient warning (Davis 2007: 
51-57; McEnaney 2000: 52).
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